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THIRD PARTIES AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: POLIHEURISTIC 
DECISION THEORY AND BRITISH MANDATE PALESTINE POLICY
1
 
 
CARLY BECKERMAN-BOYS 
University of Birmingham 
 
When dealing with the importance of third parties in the Arab-Israeli
2
 conflict, 
the example of United States involvement is most frequently cited. From President 
Truman’s declaration of support for Israel in 1948 to Obama’s first term commitment 
to Israeli-Palestinian talks, the dominant American role as mediator and facilitator in a 
search for Middle East peace has overshadowed attempts made by other players to 
alter the trajectory of negotiations. The United States’ position as sole superpower 
assists this singular perspective, but it is not the first great power to dominate third 
party intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and considering the potential for 
waning U.S. economic and political importance, it is not likely to be the last. The 
history of the conflict is beset by broad diplomatic failures, and so third party motives, 
intentions and constraints must be a crucial element to comprehending it as a whole.  
In order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the international 
dynamic of third party intervention in the conflict, it is first necessary to understand 
how policy towards it is formulated. This requires systematizing the relationship 
between domestic politics and foreign policy in a framework that is not country-
specific. The solution must involve a multi-level, multi-disciplinary analysis and a 
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 Although the case study in this paper occurred in 1922 before the creation of Israel, the term “Arab-
Israeli” conflict is appropriate considering the continuity of tensions between the two communities 
before and after 1948. This terminology avoids unnecessary confusion with potentially misleading 
language such as “Arab-Jewish” or “Arab-Zionist” conflict. 
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framework that applies decision-making theory to historical case studies in order to 
distill generalizable analyses without sacrificing realistic complexity. Poliheuristic 
Decision (Ph) Theory is a useful tool to provide this type of analysis. Using a two-
stage decision-making process, the theory provides a capacity for detail coupled with 
outcome validity as well as the ability to address what otherwise appears to be 
irrational behavior on the part of third parties. Poliheuristic Decision Theory’s 
fundamental assertion of a two-stage decision-making process operates as follows: in 
the first stage, alternatives are eliminated from the choice set based on 
noncompensatory risk presented to the political dimension (Mintz and Geva 1997; 
Mintz 2002). The second stage of the decision-making process then attempts to bridge 
the divide between rational choice and cognitive schools by allowing the decision-
maker to go through an analytic process of choosing an option that minimizes risk and 
guarantees rewards (Mintz 2002).  
In relation to the study of third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this is 
achieved most effectively through a qualitative case study, not least because a 
traditional quantitative study of multiple nation states’ involvement is unlikely to 
provide the detail necessary to understand this type of decision-making in the early 
stages of its study. While it is possible to use Poliheuristic Decision Theory in large-N 
studies (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004; Brulé and Mintz 2006), the nature of shifting 
and routine third party roles is more problematic to classify than crisis behavior. In 
addition, a qualitative approach utilizing Ph theory then also allows for an explanation 
for third party behavior that defies rationality – as defined by the rational choice 
model as purposive action seeking utility maximization (MacDonald 2003; Allison 
1971).  Crucially, the Ph approach provides a different but still widely generalizable 
understanding of rationality, one based primarily on the logic of political survival and 
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the non-compensatory principle (Mintz 2004). As this principle is excluded from both 
rational choice and the cybernetic model favored by cognitive theorists (Brulé 2008, 
267), Ph theory provides a fundamental reframing of investigations into third party 
intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict, from a focus on external to internal variables, 
the link between domestic political concerns and foreign policy decision-making and 
providing a rational explanation for otherwise irrational choices.  
This paper deals with Britain, as the first great power to invest itself in what 
became the Arab-Israeli conflict in mandate Palestine. The case under scrutiny is a 
British cabinet-level decision in 1922 – in the form of the Churchill White Paper – to 
affirm the policy of building a Jewish national home in Palestine (based on the 
Balfour Declaration 1917) despite violent Arab opposition.  Due to the wealth of 
archival material available, the use of a British case study is both appropriate and 
expedient; in applying Ph theory to this case study, the paper seeks to demonstrate the 
potential efficacy and generalizability of this poliheuristic approach to the study of 
third party roles in the conflict more generally, as well as to provide an explanation 
for the British cabinet’s lack of utility maximization in 1922.  
In October 1917, the British cabinet approved publication of the Balfour 
Declaration, which pledged support for a Jewish national home in Palestine a month 
before British troops successfully occupied Jerusalem. This promise was a wartime 
gamble made in conjunction with other, contradictory pledges to France (the Sykes-
Picot Agreement 1916) and the Arabs (promises made by Sir Henry McMahon to 
Sharif Hussein of Mecca). When the First World War ended the following year, there 
was seemingly little to prevent Britain reneging on promises made during the four-
year crisis. However, despite violent protests within Palestine, the cabinet affirmed 
the policy of a Jewish national home in the Churchill White Paper 1922. Between the 
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declaration and its affirmation, two British commissions of inquiry uncovered 
fundamental and irresolvable flaws in the national home policy, making a simple cost-
benefit analysis incapable of recommending its continuation. Why then, did the 
British cabinet affirm a commitment to involve itself in the Zionist project and 
specifically, to support Zionist political aspirations in Palestine rather than the 
nationalist ambitions of their Arab counterparts? Poliheuristic Decision Theory 
provides a convincing analysis. 
In applying Ph theory’s two-stage decision-making framework to Britain’s 
national home policy, it is possible to demonstrate why the cabinet decided to affirm 
the policy in 1922 and how this very early example of third party intervention in the 
conflict was concluded entirely without reference to the interests of either community 
in Palestine. This paper argues that in the first stage of the decision-making process, 
the British cabinet rejected alternatives that scored too low on the most important, 
political dimension. Key variables considered reflect criteria outlined by Mintz 
(2004): threat to dignity, post-war economic decline and inter-party rivalry. Once 
options were eliminated, the cabinet chose among the remaining alternatives in the 
second stage of decision-making by seeking to minimize costs on the substantive, 
strategic dimension. This analysis reveals a third party intervention in the burgeoning 
Arab-Israeli conflict based primarily on the need to satisfy British domestic political 
concerns. It concludes that Ph theory provides a cogent explanation and post-diction 
of this decision as well as the ability to generalize to later and more culturally and 
politically diverse case studies, making it a highly useful theory of decision-making to 
assess third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
Poliheuristic Decision Theory 
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The link between domestic and international politics is methodologically 
elusive. Although Foreign Policy Analysis (F.P.A.) is a subfield within international 
relations that focuses on human actors to demonstrate the decision-making processes 
behind foreign policy, the integration of the domestic into the international has 
remained a challenge. Within F.P.A., the debate has emerged from a divergence of 
theoretical perspectives. The two leading paradigms are the rational choice/expected 
utility model, originally the product of Von Neumann and Morgenstern in the 1940s, 
and a second based on the cybernetic perspective established by Herbert Simon (1959, 
1985) and refined by John Steinbruner (1974) (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and 
Oneal 1991). Broadly defined, rational choice models apply cost-benefit analyses to 
the study of international politics (Mintz and Geva 1997). The simplicity of rational 
choice creates highly effective predictive models, but they lack a descriptive quality 
that reflects reality and neglect the role of intricate combinations of variables such as 
domestic politics. This poses not only etymological problems, but it cannot explain 
instances when a decision-maker fails to choose the option with the most preferred 
consequence, or rather it cannot systematize the constraints that lead to suboptimal 
decision-making (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Such irrational decision-making is not 
inexplicable, however, it is merely outside of the scope provided by expected utility. 
This is why rational choice has been challenged by the cognitive approach, which 
instead focuses on the complex variables that impact decision-making such as 
personality and culture (Geertz 1973; Mintz 1997; Hermann 2003). However, this 
second approach champions the minute intricacies of human behaviour at the expense 
of useful generalizability, so it too is incapable of providing the methodological link 
between domestic and international politics (Jones 1994; Stein and Welch 1997).  
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These ostensibly rival models highlight different aspects of decision-making 
and possess various strengths and weaknesses. In an attempt to bridge the divide 
between them and attain both the descriptive accuracy of cognitivists, necessary to 
evaluate domestic politics, and the predictive success of rational choice models, 
crucial for applicability in the international environment, Poliheuristic Decision 
Theory utilizes both paradigms in a two-stage decision-making process (Mintz 1997). 
Whereas the second stage is governed by a relatively simple rational choice model 
discussed more below, the first stage is based on a cognitivist approach and is 
determined by five key characteristics: decision-making is nonholistic, dimension-
based, noncompensatory, satisficing and order-sensitive (Mintz and Geva 1997).  
First, the nonholistic or nonexhaustive nature of decision-making 
differentiates the poliheuristic approach from other F.P.A. models based on utility, 
which demand that a decision-maker conducts an exhaustive search of alternatives in 
order to compare costs versus benefits between them (Mintz and Geva 1997). Instead, 
Ph theory assumes the decision-maker “adopts heuristic decision rules that do not 
require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or 
rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria” (Mintz and Geva 
1997, 85). This nonholistic approach means that the choice set is defined by a 
dimension-based rather than an alternative-based search; decision-makers compare 
alternatives to a cluster of variables within the same organizing theme rather than 
assessing alternatives in a vacuum (Ostrom et al. 1980). For example, the political 
dimension might include elements such as public opinion polls, the leader’s 
popularity, the state of the economy and domestic opposition – variables used to 
evaluate the consequences of a chosen alternative on the political dimension. As the 
search is nonholistic, how many criteria and variables are used for any dimension is 
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likely to vary as the decision-maker considers different alternatives along each 
organizing theme (Mintz and Geva 1997). This means that any alternative that fails to 
meet a certain threshold on the most important dimension will be discarded (Mintz 
1993).  
Assuming political actors operate under self-interested motivations, politicians 
see gains and losses in political terms; the most important dimension, therefore, is the 
political dimension (DeRouen 2002). How a leader perceives the political 
consequences of his or her actions plays a crucial role in the decision-making process 
(Mintz 2004). Loss-aversion overrules all other considerations, and so decision-
making is driven by the desire to avoid failure rather than to achieve success 
(Anderson 1983). Consequently, “a low score in the political dimension cannot be 
compensated for by a high score in some other dimensions” (Mintz and Geva 1997, 
84). This is the noncompensatory principle, and this loss-aversion variable can be 
operationalized in several ways:  
 
Threat to a leader’s survival; Significant drop in public support for a policy; 
Significant drop in popularity; The prospects of an electoral defeat; Domestic 
opposition; Threat to regime survival; Inter-party rivalry and competition; 
Internal or external challenge to the regime; Potential collapse of the coalition 
government or regime; Threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy 
of a leader; Demonstrations, riots, and so forth; The existence of veto players 
(e.g., pivotal parties in parliamentary government (Mintz 2004, 9).  
 
Consequently, this model represents a process in which alternatives are 
selected or rejected based on a satisficing rather than maximizing rule. The 
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poliheuristic approach seeks acceptable options rather than maximizing alternatives 
because it is likely that some dimensions will remain unconsidered even after a 
decision is made (Mintz and Geva 1997, 87). Rejecting the invariance assumption that 
“two alternative formulations of the same problem should yield the same choice” 
(Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 727), this stage also considers that the order in which 
variables are considered may impact the elimination of options from the choice set 
(Mintz and Geva 1997).  
After options are eliminated in the first stage, a second stage based on a cost-
benefit analysis selects a final alternative that becomes the choice. Although DeRouen 
and Sprecher (2002; 2004) argue that the second stage utilizes either E.B.A. or LEX. 
Processes, the Poliheuristic model does not specify the conditions under which either 
strategy is selected (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2002, 32). Cognitive psychology 
suggests this depends on the structural complexity of remaining choices (Hansen and 
Helgeson 1996; Payne, Bettman and Luce 1996; Payne 1976), but the selection of 
E.B.A. or LEX. creates a further problem. E.B.A. is simply “a sequential elimination 
decision heuristic” (DeRouen 2002, 16), and the LEX. decision rule involves the 
selection of an alternative that provides the greatest utility for the most important 
substantive dimension (Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1988). Both of these rules 
undermine the premise of rationality as defined by the rational choice model 
(MacDonald 2003; Allison 1971) and so contravene the original ethos of a 
poliheuristic theory as bridge-builder between cognitive and rational approaches. The 
difference is negligible to outcome validity – as the key assumption in stage two is 
that a decision-maker seeks to minimize costs and maximize rewards (Mintz 2002) – 
but this remains an unclear procedural element in the theory.  
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These characteristics form the cognitivist foundation of Ph theory’s first stage 
and the rational choice basis for stage two. Options are eliminated from the choice set 
that do not meet requirements on the political dimension, and then the remaining 
alternatives are assessed with a cost-benefit analysis. Determining the cut off point, 
however, is one crucial element of Ph application that is potentially problematic. 
Mintz and Geva developed a decision board (Mintz and Geva 1997) in which 
numerical values are assigned to variables within the political dimension, but this 
process involves the same level of educated estimation required in any purely 
qualitative analysis. Assigning numerical values on a decision board allows for 
clarification in research design, but it does not solve the underlying problem of 
context specificity and the dangers of selection bias. Politicians’ levels of sensitivity 
to the political dimension, which variables are included in the political dimension, and 
the other dimensions under consideration are unique to each case study and demand a 
certain amount of specialist knowledge. This poses no fundamental obstacle to the 
successful application of Ph theory to either historical case studies or contemporary 
analyses, but it should be recognized that the theory cannot be applied without a 
certain amount of prerequisite research needed to appreciate the domestic political 
environment under consideration. Just as the widely accepted rational choice model 
ranks preferences according to expected utility, the first stage of Ph theory essentially 
if not methodologically ranks options according to their expected utility on the 
variables of the political dimension. Rather than selecting a winning option, however, 
this process simply eliminates the losers. As this case study deals with a cabinet rather 
than a presidential system, however, the exact process of eliminating options in a 
group setting is somewhat elusive. 
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Although Redd has addressed case studies in which a single decision-maker is 
influenced by bureaucratic advice (2002; 2005; Christensen and Redd 2004), this is 
not the same as group decision-making. Conversely, Brummer directly applies Ph 
theory to the bureaucratic politics model, but rather than integrating bureaucratic 
politics into the poliheuristic theory, Brummer utilizes Ph to facilitate bureaucratic 
politics’ process validity. Having specifically chosen a case study in which party 
politics was unlikely to play a role due to a large government majority, Brummer 
replaces the noncompensatory loss aversion variable with a “noncompensatory 
organizational loss aversion variable” in which the key dimension is not domestic 
politics but organizational interests (Brummer 2012, 2-6). While useful to 
Bureaucratic Politics, this approach must assume the existence of multiple causal 
paths and so it sacrifices the predictable outcome validity needed to maintain the 
central function of Ph theory. Instead, the best argument for group decision-making 
within a poliheuristic approach can be found in Brulé (2008). Brulé argues that 
decisions made in group settings can be addressed “as an n-actor, m-dimensional 
bargaining scenario in which preferences are aggregated according to the two-stage 
process Poliheuristic theory describes” (Brulé 2008, 283). This is based on the 
assumption that all members of the group possess “an effective veto on any decision,” 
so “the aggregation of group preferences into a single choice would, in the first stage, 
involve the elimination of all alternatives that are noncompensatory to any member of 
the group” (Brulé 2008, 283). Rather than every member of the British cabinet 
possessing an effective veto, however, this case study assumes a narrowing of the 
group to only the key actors associated with Palestine in the interwar period – 
principally though not limited to, the Prime Minister, Colonial Secretary, Foreign 
Secretary and Chiefs of Staff. These figures dominated cabinet discussions on 
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Palestine and carried the entire group, making Brulé’s characterization of group 
decision-making through member-veto most appropriate. This, however, is an area of 
Poliheuristic Decision Theory that remains procedurally undeveloped.  
In providing a post-diction of the British decision in 1922 to affirm the policy 
of a Jewish national home despite violent Arab opposition, the variables considered 
within the political dimension have been selected based on the long list of criteria 
provided by Mintz (2004), out of which archival research pinpointed only three key 
variables considered by the British cabinet. In a study designed to provide prediction 
rather than post-diction, the specific variables would need to be highlighted by 
intelligence or open source analysts. After defining the choice set, the relevant 
variables within the political dimension for Britain’s 1922 decision emerged as threat 
to dignity, post-war economic decline and inter-party rivalry. Then in stage two, the 
remaining option was assessed according to LEX. processes on the strategic 
dimension. 
 
Stage One 
 
 When advocating the use of Ph theory to explain the British decision to affirm 
the national home policy in 1922, it is first necessary to acknowledge that several 
factors make this decision irrational according to the rational choice model, as it failed 
to demonstrate purposive action seeking utility maximization (MacDonald 2003; 
Allison 1971). A simple cost-benefit analysis based on information available to 
decision-makers at the time would have predicted a renunciation of the national home 
policy. This is evident from the reports submitted in 1920 and 1921 by two 
commissions of inquiry. Following the Nebi Musa riots of April 1920, the Palin 
Commission pinpointed fundamental flaws in the national home policy, and following 
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the Jaffa riots of May 1921, the Haycraft Commission independently reiterated many 
of the same concerns.  
The first riots under British rule occurred roughly two and a half years after 
the Balfour Declaration was first issued, but the Palin Commission found it was 
“undoubtedly the starting point of the whole trouble” (WO 32/9614). Major-General 
Palin and his fellow commissioners warned the British cabinet “[t]hat the situation at 
present obtaining in Palestine is exceedingly dangerous” (WO 32/9614). The fears 
and tensions highlighted in the report might have been inconsequential if another riot 
on a worse scale had not erupted the following year in Jaffa. These disturbances were 
also the subject of an investigation, headed by Chief Justice of Palestine, Sir Thomas 
Haycraft. The report concluded that “the fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the 
subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and 
hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with 
Jewish immigration” (Cmd 1540). Politically, the main fear was “that the Jews when 
they had sufficiently increased in numbers would become so highly organized and so 
well armed as to be able to overcome the Arabs, and rule over and oppress them” 
(Cmd 1540). Economically, the influx of skilled Jewish laborers and artisans was seen 
as a threat to Arab livelihoods (Cmd 1540).  
In light of the tensions highlighted by these commission reports, the cabinet in 
London was presented with three options: continue supporting the creation of a 
Jewish national home in Palestine – imposing it with the threat or use of force – 
limiting the national home policy in a manner acceptable to its critics, or repudiating 
the policy altogether. The General Staff articulated these options in practical terms: 
“(a.) An alteration of policy as regards Jewish immigration; (b.) An increase in the 
British garrison; or (c.) The acceptance of serious danger to the Jewish population” 
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(CAB 24/126 July 13, 1921). The cabinet agreed their courses were to “withdraw 
from their Declaration, refer the Mandate back to the League of Nations, set up an 
Arab National Government and slow down or stop the immigration of Jews: or they 
could carry out the present policy with greater vigour and encourage the arming of the 
Jews” (CAB 23/26). It was obvious to the cabinet that “peace was impossible on the 
lines of the Balfour Declaration” (CAB 23/26). The situation required some form of 
action, not least to protect the British officials administering Palestine. These 
concerns suggest that the national home policy provided very little comparative utility 
and would likely have been discarded, making the 1922 decision to reaffirm the 
policy irrational. Applying Ph theory to the decision-making process, however, allows 
a more nuanced analysis of the nature of this early third party role in the developing 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 According to the poliheuristic theory, the first stage of decision-making is 
presumed to be based on political survival rather than a complete assessment of costs 
and benefits (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004, 61). A decision-maker is first concerned 
with the political implications of a decision, so variables like public opinion, the 
economy and domestic opposition “may be used to evaluate the consequence of a 
chosen alternative on this organizing theme” (Mintz 1993, 600). Using the list of 
variables to be considered as part of the political dimension provided by Mintz 
(2004), this section demonstrates how the noncompensatory loss aversion variable 
was operationalized in British decision-making regarding Palestine through threat to 
dignity, post-war economic decline and inter-party rivalry; options were eliminated 
from the choice set by discarding those that failed to meet requirements on the 
political dimension.  
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Variable: Threat to Dignity (C Head) 
 The threat to dignity is one of the variables outlined by Mintz (2004) that can 
be considered on the political dimension because of its inherent danger to political 
survival. In the context of British decision-making in the early 1920s, the threat to 
dignity emanated from stature within the international community. Although British 
policy on the Jewish national home was officially made in Westminster, it acquired an 
international element first as a wartime promise approved by the Entente, then in the 
draft mandate assigned to Britain by the Principled Allied Powers in 1920 (Britain, 
France, Italy and Japan with a U.S. representative present) and finally in negotiations 
with the League of Nations and the United States for the mandate’s approval (CAB 
24/159). A complex international framework was built upon a fundamentally flawed 
policy, but reversing the process would have been far too damaging to the political 
dimension. Concerns for dignity on the international diplomatic stage led the British 
cabinet to eliminate the option of repudiating the national home policy in the first 
stage of decision-making. 
Palestine’s retention by the British Empire was not a foregone conclusion, but 
became more likely after the First World War ended. Ultimately for Britain, the 
problem of Palestine’s trusteeship was less an issue of imperial expansionism and 
more about avoiding unwelcome intrusions. British military, strategic and energy 
interests in Egypt, Arabia and Mesopotamia made the prospect of a rival power in 
Palestine immediately following a world war decidedly unattractive. British Prime 
Minister Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Clemenceau agreed in secret that 
Britain would annex Palestine and oil-rich Mosul in Mesopotamia in exchange for an 
exclusively French Syria and share of the Mosul oil (Lowe and Dockrill 1972, 359). 
Through this bargaining and a pledge of good faith towards the published Balfour 
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Declaration that allowed more general League of Nations approval, the principle of a 
British Palestine became diplomatically entrenched very early, and before British 
officials had time to appreciate the potential difficulties this entailed. 
A further complication was the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, signed in 
August 1920. Article 95 of the Turkish peace treaty reinforced the draft mandate in 
committing Britain to supporting a Jewish national home in Palestine (CAB 24/125, 
June 2, 1921). Since the document carried signatures from Britain and the Dominions 
(including India), France, Italy, Japan, Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Serbia, Czechoslovakia and Turkey, the scale of international agreement 
essentially prevented repudiation of the national home without creating a legal 
quagmire (CAB 24/159). The Balfour Declaration had rapidly become the entire 
public basis of a British Palestine, and the length of negotiations with the French and 
other powers made it less and less likely the national home could be reversed without 
substantial international humiliation, if the necessary agreements from League 
members could be achieved at all (FO 608/98/588).  
By June 1921, the power of this international body to inflict humiliation on the 
British Empire became readily apparent. There was “serious risk” that when the 
Council of the League of Nations next met to vote on the final mandates, they would 
be rejected on the basis of Italian and American objections (CAB 24/125, June 8, 
1921). Italy was raising the concerns of the Vatican regarding guardianship of 
Christian holy places in Palestine, and the American State Department, despite its 
position outside of the League, formally objected to their exclusion from the 
consultation process (CAB 24/126, June 29, 1921; 24/136, May 16, 1922). In light of 
this diplomatic deadlock and the problems Britain was already facing in Palestine, the 
option to withdraw from the territory altogether was considered (CAB 24/125, June 8, 
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1921). On a diplomatic level, the British cabinet considered taking the opportunity to 
repudiate the terms of the national home policy while the entire mandate was in 
question by “publicly confessing that they are insecurely based and rebuilding them 
on a firmer foundation” (CAB 24/125, June 8, 1921). Unfortunately for the policy’s 
opponents, however, the Council of the League agreed to postpone a final vote from 
1921 to July 1922 rather than create a situation in which all prior negotiations were 
void. This meant that after June 1921, any modifications to the mandate would have 
required separate approval from the great powers within the prohibitively short period 
of one year (CAB 24/126, June 29, 1921). American support for the draft mandate 
was forthcoming on May 3, 1922 – in a joint resolution by the United States Congress 
– but this meant Britain was merely further entrenched in the national home policy 
(CAB 24/159).  
Between this public American declaration of support and the final League vote 
on July 22, 1922, the Churchill White paper was published. It not only confirmed the 
national home policy, but also specifically cited the diplomatic ties preventing its 
alteration: the “Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principle Allied 
Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change” 
(Cmd 1700). Ultimately, the loss of diplomatic dignity associated with reversing the 
Balfour Declaration policy meant this option failed to meet requirements on the 
political dimension and was eliminated from the choice set in the first stage of 
decision-making.  
 
Variable: The Economy (C Head) 
 The economy may seem more like a substantive dimension in the second stage 
of decision-making, but in times of hardship it can serve as a variable on the political 
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dimension. This is because the variable under consideration, though ostensibly 
dealing with issues related to the economy, is really concerned with strategic political 
manipulation of perceptions of the economy, and as such, it requires consideration on 
the political dimension. The post-war coalition under Liberal British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George was faced with the major task of reconstruction in a harsh 
economic climate. As a prolonged economic crisis hit Britain by 1920-21, the entire 
government was under pressure to spend less abroad and more at home. One of the 
most expensive elements of Britain’s empire was the troop numbers needed to 
maintain it. This meant that post-war economic decline removed an option from the 
choice set in the first stage of decision-making. Imposing the national home policy 
with the threat or use of force – i.e. the stationing of troops sufficient in number to 
protect a very small Jewish minority from the Arab majority – was far too damaging 
to the political dimension.  
The severe contraction of markets during the war (including the loss of 
Britain’s largest trading partner, Germany) meant Britain slid quickly into its first 
globalized economic crisis. An industrial recession struck in May 1920, and Britain 
was facing a high unemployment problem by the end of the year. More than two 
million were out of work in December 1921, and the average unemployment rate 
stayed over 10% for several years, higher than anything recorded before the war 
(Constantine 1984, 89). These economic problems also brought large-scale industrial 
action. A “triple alliance” of workers from the mining, railway and transport 
industries provided continual unrest (Amery 1953, 205). As well as the 
demonstrations, marches and occasional violence of British workers, the government 
was also trying to deal with complaints from big business and institutions like the 
Bank of England, all clamoring for cuts (Constantine 1984, 90). However, a 
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complicating factor was Britain’s position at the center of imperial authority 
combined with communal responsibility as part of the Supreme Allied Council and 
also the League of Nations.  
In terms of the Middle East, this conflict between maintaining an empire and 
satisfying the domestic need for economies was embodied by Winston Churchill’s 
time at the War and Colonial Offices. Churchill pushed the Colonial Office’s new 
Middle East Department “towards a curtailment of our responsibilities and our 
expenditure” (CAB 24/106). He was only prepared to invest in fertile territories, such 
as East and West Africa, where development could contribute rapidly to British 
coffers (CAB 24/106). For the Middle East, he recommended placing responsibility 
for maintaining order on the air force; this would be much cheaper than army 
garrisons or cavalry because as it required only a few airstrips with no earth-bound 
lines of communication or animals (CAB 24/106). This focus on spending cuts, 
however, meant considerations of cost came before the safety of Britain’s Zionist 
subjects in Palestine. C.I.G.S Henry Wilson called the cabinet’s attention to the 
weakness of British garrisons in the Middle East in May 1920 (CAB 24/106). The 
General Staff feared the boundaries of economy would leave them unable to fulfill 
imperial policy. They pointed to a “real danger” and how the government’s pro-
Zionist stance was “likely to increase our difficulties with the Arabs, and there are 
already indications that military action may be necessary, both to maintain the frontier 
and concurrently to preserve peace internally” (CAB 24/106). On January 26, 1921, 
Churchill called for the further reduction of troops from Palestine, which the General 
Staff advised was too low and invited rebellion (CAB 24/118). The Jaffa riots broke 
out three months later. Nevertheless, in assuming responsibility for Palestine first in 
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the War Office and then in the Colonial Office, the only relevant issue to Churchill 
remained spending cuts. 
The Jaffa Riots themselves did not alter Churchill’s position on this issue of 
cost. General Congreve submitted a memo to the Colonial Office in June 1921 
entitled ‘situation in Palestine”; it said Palestine was in “increasing danger” that 
would require “heavy expenditure” and meet “bitter resentment” from Zionists “for 
not protecting them better” (CAB 24/125, June 9, 1921). “I do not think,” Congreve 
concluded, things are going to get better in this part of the world, but rather worse” 
(CAB 24/125, June 9, 1921). Churchill circulated this memo to the cabinet, but only 
to highlight how he disagreed with it. This was one month after the Jaffa riots, but 
neither the unrest nor advice from local officials appeared in policy discussions on 
cuts (CAB 24/131).  
As War and then Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill’s singular drive to 
reduce spending reflected the political situation faced by the entire coalition cabinet. 
The expense associated with troops meant Palestine could not receive the necessary 
reinforcements needed to protect the Zionist experiment from violence. In a time of 
widespread industrial action, high unemployment and general economic downturn, 
the political cost was too high and this option was removed from the choice set. In 
this sense, the economy variable was closely connected to the variable of inter-party 
politics, which is discussed below. 
 
Variable: Inter-party Politics (C Head) 
One of the most important aspects of Britain’s early Palestine policy was the 
relationship with inter-party politics. This section argues that criticisms coming 
mainly from the Conservative Party led to an option being eliminated from the choice 
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set in the first stage of decision-making. The “coupon” election of December 1918 left 
the Liberal David Lloyd George Prime Minister at the head of a majority 
Conservative coalition. Dissension with his leadership grew steadily, and virulent 
Parliamentary criticism of the government’s Palestine policy meant the coalition was 
unable to continue the national home as it stood in the Balfour Declaration and draft 
mandate (which included a commitment to put it into effect) (Cmd 1785). 
As the post-war political climate was marked by a significant swing to the 
right – the main issues of the 1918 election were the fate of Germany and the Kaiser, 
with many calling for his trial and execution along with the expulsion of Germans 
from Britain – the atmosphere among the electorate favored a Conservative victory 
(Wilson 1964, 40-41). This climate placed a great deal of right-wing pressure on 
Lloyd George at the head of his coalition cabinet. 
After violence erupted in Palestine in 1920 and 1921, the cabinet’s handling of 
Zionism became one of several key issues with which to criticize Lloyd George. 
Although there had been a substantial amount of backbench support for the Balfour 
Declaration in 1917, this had merely reflected a need for wartime solidarity that was 
hardly crucial by 1920 (Defries 2001, 99). The main inter-party dispute surrounded 
costs. Conservative MPs Sir Frederick Hall, Sir Harry Brittain and Sir Henry Page-
Croft raised the issue in July 1920 and again in December that “an enormous amount 
of money has been expended in this direction for which we are not getting any return” 
(CS July 15, 1920, Col. 2595; December 2, 1920, Col. 1439). Opposition to the 
national home then began in earnest in March 1921 and continued in the House of 
Lords following the Jaffa Riots (CS March 2, 1921, Col. 2030; HLD June 8, 1921, 
Col. 470-9; CS June 14, 1921, Col. 265-334; HLD June 15, 1921, Col. 559-73). 
Colonial Secretary Churchill assured that “[w]hile the situation still fills us with a 
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certain amount of anxiety […] I believe it is one that we shall be able to shape […] 
within the limits of the expense I have mentioned” (CS June 14, 1921, Col. 265-334). 
Later that month, however, he advised the cabinet to withdraw from Palestine 
(Makovsky 2007, 103). This was because the Liberal Churchill and the rest of the 
coalition were feeling a great deal of pressure on the Palestine issue. The criticisms 
they faced were potent because they reflected political issues masquerading as 
substantive concerns, and these fell largely under the Conservative banner of “Anti-
Waste”.  
The coalition cabinet tried to downplay inter-party differences, so many policy 
debates raged in the press instead (O’Morgan 1979, 169). An overwhelming majority 
of the 1918-enfranchised population (79.1%) had never voted before and were 
clamouring for information about politics – enhancing the role of newspapers, 
especially with regard to foreign affairs, for which the press was one of very few 
public sources of information (Kinnear 1973, 21-22). Consequently, the press outlets 
that were highly critical of the Lloyd George government were also quite powerful. 
This was demonstrated by the Anti-Waste League, a campaign led by Conservative 
peer and press baron Lord Rothermere, and championed in the House by his son, the 
M.P. Esmond Harmsworth. Using an axe as its symbol to represent spending-cuts, it 
was credited with winning two by-elections in Conservative seats (Kinnear 1973, 24). 
One sign that Lloyd George felt under pressure from this movement was the 
formation of The Committee on National Expenditure under the chairmanship of 
Conservative politician and businessman, Sir Eric Campbell Geddes, which, as 
expected, called for major spending reductions across most departments (Cmd 1581; 
1582; 1589). Rothermere’s brother, Lord Northcliffe, was also using his papers The 
Times, the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror to criticize Palestine based on its cost, as 
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well as the idea that handing Muslim holy sites to Jews would inflame India. 
Northcliffe’s death in 1922 meant these papers passed to Rothermere, and they too 
became direct proponents of Anti-Waste.  
In the same period, previously supportive Lord Beaverbrook also abandoned 
Lloyd George and used his Daily Express and Sunday Express to propagate the myth 
of a Jewish conspiracy; also included in this press revolt were The Spectator and the 
Morning Post, which questioned the loyalty of Jewish Liberal politicians such as 
Palestine High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel and India Secretary Sir Edwin 
Montagu (Defries 2001, 109-110). This was particularly unsound since Montagu had 
been one of few politicians adamantly opposed to the Balfour Declaration in 1917, 
arguing that it placed the status of Jews around the world in jeopardy (CAB 24/24). 
However, it would be a mistake to view these anti-Semitic attacks outside of their 
political context. Montagu was a target principally because he opposed the Anti-
Waste League and Geddes’ spending cuts (CAB 24/127). The sheer virulence of such 
press attacks made Churchill and many members of the coalition cabinet nervous 
(CAB 24/134). 
Opposition to the national home continued to grow, and there was a 
controversial debate in the House of Lords in June. Lord Islington introduced a 
motion against the Palestine mandate on the basis that the national home policy broke 
promises made to the Arabs and was “inviting subsequent catastrophe” (HLD June 
21, 1922, Col. 994-1033). To the government’s chagrin, Islington’s motion carried 60 
votes to 29 (HLD June 21, 1922, Col. 994-1033). This had symbolic more than legal 
importance and was followed by a Commons debate less than two weeks later. 
Joynson-Hicks introduced a vote on Palestine on the basis that the mandate had never 
been approved by the House (CS July 4, 1922, Col. 221-343). It had the opposite 
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outcome that Joynson-Hicks intended. Churchill secured a vote of confidence 292 to 
35 (CS July 4, 1922, Col. 221-343). Crucially, one vital document had been published 
on July 1, 1922, between the two debates, and this was the Churchill White Paper 
(Grief 2008).  
Although it re-affirmed the policy of British support for a Jewish national 
home in Palestine, the document placed an important new restriction on the Zionist 
project, limiting Jewish immigration to economic capacity (Cmd 1700). When the 
white paper was published, it was accompanied by records of communication between 
the Colonial Secretary and Arab as well as Zionist leaders, demonstrating how the 
British government was involved as a third party in what was becoming the Arab-
Israeli conflict. This involvement, however, consisted of addressing domestic political 
challenges. Each term of the white paper answered specific charges leveled by 
members of the Commons and Lords. The Churchill White Paper answered 
accusations that Britain was depriving Palestine’s Arabs of their own home: 
‘statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly 
Jewish Palestine. […] His Majesty’s Government regard any such expectation as 
impracticable and have no such aim in view” (Cmd 1700). To demonstrate this, the 
white paper formally linked Jewish immigration to the Palestine economy (Cmd 
1700). It also addressed the charge of broken promises: “The whole of Palestine west 
of the Jordan was […] excluded from Sir Henry McMahon’s pledge” (Cmd 1700). 
Answering allegations that the national home would inflame Indian religious 
sensibilities, the white paper also highlighted how “the present administration has 
transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the 
entire control of Moslem Religious endowments” (Cmd 1700). Lord Islington had 
declared in June that the national home policy could not continue unaltered, and he 
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was correct. Under the pressure of inter-party politics played out in Parliament and in 
the press, the coalition had been forced to eliminate the option of continuing with a 
policy of total support for the Balfour Declaration.  
 
Stage Two 
 
 After the first stage of decision-making eliminated all options from the choice 
set that failed to meet requirements on the political dimension, only one alternative 
remained. In this case study, the British cabinet could neither entirely support nor 
repudiate the national home, leaving the single option of continuing, but imposing 
limitations designed to address its substantive weaknesses and political critics. 
Although the noncompensatory decision-making process does not always continue 
until only one alternative is left, it is possible that all but one option are eliminated 
due to their prohibitively high costs on the political dimension (Mintz 1993, 600). On 
a procedural note, like DeRouen and Sprecher’s proposed use of E.B.A. or LEX. 
decision rules in the second stage, the existence of a sole remaining option 
undermines the original ethos of Ph theory to some extent. Although intended to 
bridge between cognitive and rational schools, it struggles to achieve this aim when 
the second stage of decision-making is denied a cost-benefit analysis between 
alternatives. Again, this does not impact outcome validity, but it does demonstrate an 
area where further procedural clarification would be beneficial.  
The above analysis of stage one in the decision-making process reveals how 
only a solitary option remained after those that failed to meet domestic political 
requirements were eliminated. The British cabinet had no other alternative but to 
continue with the national home policy by imposing limitations on it. As the 
poliheuristic approach seeks acceptable options, any single remaining alternative is 
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compared “to predetermined values along a selected set of dimensions” (Mintz and 
Geva 1997, 87). In the case of post-war Palestine, one dimension emerged as 
substantive for decision-makers. Rather than seeking to maximize in this case, the 
remaining alternative was found to satisfice (Steinbruner 1974; Ostrom and Job 1986; 
Lui 2002) the sole substantive dimension, which was the military, or strategic 
dimension.  
 
The Military Dimension (C Head) 
In the context of the Jewish national home, the only dimension decision-
makers considered outside of those variables constituting the political dimension, was 
the military, or strategic dimension. This sole dimension has been identified through 
archival research, but it demonstrates the same issues of process validity discussed in 
relation to the existence of only a single option after stage one. Rather than maximize 
rewards, the second stage of decision-making ensured that the remaining option did 
not incur costs. Palestine was debateable as a military asset, but any options 
remaining after the first stage of decision-making had to satisfice British military and 
strategic interests in the region. 
During and after the First World War, the British cabinet frequently 
considered the prospect of another similar conflict. Safeguarding routes to India, 
including lines of communication through Egypt and the Suez Canal was paramount. 
These lines of communication became even more important after the war because 
Britain’s empire had grown in Asia and Africa as well as the Middle East. The 
importance of Palestine in this geo-political worldview, however, was a matter of 
opinion. In June 1918, Lloyd George asserted that “if we were to be thrown back as 
an Empire upon our old traditional policy of utilizing the command of the sea in order 
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to cut off our enemies from all the sources of supply and from all possible means of 
expansion, north, east, south, and west, Palestine would be invaluable” (CAB 23/43). 
It “secured the defence of Egypt” and losing Palestine “would not only involve the 
interruption of a main artery of our imperial communications, but would react upon 
our whole situation in the East, and even in India” (CAB 23/44A). Immediately post-
war in December 1918, the army agreed with maintaining Palestine as a buffer state, 
but only ‘so long as it can be created without disturbing Mohammedian sentiment” 
(FO 609/99/1327).  
As British policy supporting a Jewish national home did indeed inflame Arab 
and Muslim opinion, however, the army and key members of the cabinet began to 
express doubts regarding its military value. By November 1920, the Chiefs of the 
Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.) advised the Cabinet that Palestine “has no 
strategical interest for the British Army” but it “constitutes a serious potential drain on 
its resources” (CAB 24/132). Winston Churchill retained the post of War Secretary at 
this time, and he agreed: “[s]o far as the security of the Empire is concerned, we are 
the weaker, rather than the stronger, by the occupation of Palestine” (CAB 24/117). 
His successor at the War Office, Sir Worthington-Evans espoused the opposing 
view, that uprisings in Egypt and Mosul increased Palestine’s importance, and the 
debate continued in Parliament into 1923 (CAB 24/129). Even those such as Churchill 
who openly questioned Palestine’s strategic value in private, publicly supported the 
“buffer state” line of reasoning. It provided a simple and convenient explanation for 
British entanglement in Palestine. Both sides of this debate, however, understood that 
Palestine could not be allowed to fall to a hostile or potentially challenging power. 
The tiny country was not necessarily crucial to British strategic defence of the empire, 
but a foreign obstruction there could be devastating (FO 609/99/1327).  
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Therefore, as long as Palestine remained in friendly hands, the military 
dimension was satisficed. The remaining option from stage one was to continue with 
the national home policy by imposing limitations on it. This alternative left Palestine 
in British hands, which was acceptable on the military, or strategic dimension, 
allowing it to become the final choice. This naturally prompts the question, however, 
what if the single remaining option had not satisficed the military dimension? This 
would have left the British cabinet with no viable options. In the continuation of a 
crisis situation, this would likely have resulted in delaying tactics until more options 
could be introduced into the choice set – which seems to have been evident in Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin’s handling of post-war Palestine before handing the problem 
to the United Nations in 1947. In the absence of a crisis situation, the result would 
most likely be inertia. This was later characterized by Whitehall’s general avoidance 
of Palestinian Arab grievances between the reversal of a critical white paper in 1931 
and the beginning of the Arab Revolt in 1936. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The role of third parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict remains an important field 
of study, and assessing these roles does require an understanding of how policy 
towards the conflict is formulated. British involvement before 1948, and so prior to 
what many scholarly works adopt as a useful point of commencement, does not 
negate its importance. Broad, sweeping British policy during the mandate formed the 
earliest intervention between Palestine’s two communities, and the wealth of research 
material available from this era provides an eerie realization of continuity in tensions 
and violence in the decades that followed. The Churchill White Paper 1922 reflected a 
British decision to affirm the policy of a Jewish national home in Palestine but with 
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restrictions designed to satisfy domestic critics, principally demanding the linkage of 
Jewish immigration to Palestine’s economic capacity. The above study demonstrates a 
concerted effort to alter the flawed policy. This means the final decision cannot be 
attributed to simpler heuristics like path dependencies. Neither wholehearted support 
for, nor renunciation of, the British-Zionist relationship were viable options because 
fundamentally, they fell outside domestic political constraints. Although the white 
paper was framed as a remedy to tensions in Palestine, therefore, it took no 
consideration of either community during the decision-making process. 
In the first stage, the cabinet rejected alternatives that failed to meet 
requirements on the most important, political dimension. Taking threat to 
international or diplomatic dignity into account meant the option to repudiate the 
national home was eliminated. The political backlash over the post-war economy 
meant the option to impose the national home with the threat or use of force also 
failed to meet requirements on the political dimension and was eliminated. Finally, 
inter-party rivalry left the cabinet unable to continue the national home as it stood in 
the Balfour Declaration and draft mandate. Consequently, the first stage of the 
decision-making process left only one alternative in the choice set. This option was 
then compared to the single substantive dimension to ensure it would not incur costs. 
The option to continue with the national home with key limitations designed to satisfy 
domestic critics was found to be acceptable on the military/strategic dimension, 
allowing it to become the final choice.  
By applying Ph theory to a single British case study, the poliheuristic 
approach allows an appreciation of this early third party role in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, but crucially, it demonstrates a coherent application of the decision-making 
theory for assessing the role of third parties throughout its timeline. Although the Ph 
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approach must involve some degree of specialist knowledge in order to determine the 
key domestic political variables at play in any particular case study, as well as the cut-
off point at which options become unacceptable on the political dimension, this is a 
process of merely whittling down Mintz’ relatively comprehensive list (2004) and 
applying an argument to evidence. Rather than negating the applicability of 
Poliheuristic Decision Theory, this element of the theory champions a more realistic 
post-Cold War analysis. When bipolarity shared with a mysterious other determined 
the course of international politics, a model based solely on basic expected utility was 
appropriate. Even so, it is still possible for one analyst to disagree with another’s 
predictive rankings, and so the Ph approach poses no methodological problems not 
already inherent in accepted F.P.A. models.  
However, as the original ethos of Ph theory was to bridge the divide between 
cognitive and rational approaches, the above study notes two procedural flaws that 
undermine this aim. DeRouen and Sprecher’s use of E.B.A. or LEX. decision rules in 
the second stage and the possibility of only a single option remaining after the first 
stage mean the theory can struggle to achieve its broader aim. This does not, however, 
pose a critical dilemma for using Poliheuristic Decision Theory as a means to 
understand third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In such explorative, archive-
based qualitative case studies, the introduction of the political dimension as initial 
determinant of final choice remains the fundamentally important point. 
In the twenty-first century, the opening of archives, the accessibility of 
decision-makers and open source material more generally does provide a unique 
opportunity to blend the cognitivist approach with rational choice in order to provide 
generalizable models. The specific variables on the political dimension will inevitably 
change between time periods and decision-makers under consideration – the media 
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and opinion polls may be less important than discontent within the military, tribal 
alliances or foreign infiltration for example. Regardless of these shifting parameters or 
indeed the theory’s minor procedural flaws, a Ph approach remains applicable because 
there is always a domestic political dimension that must be satisficed in order for 
leaders and governments to make decisions. Rather than attempting to provide a 
panacea decision-making model equally relevant to the laboratory as the world stage, 
Ph theory is specific to the political environment. Understanding foreign policy 
decision-making within this methodology is constrained only by the amount of 
information available to make value judgments regarding variables on the political 
dimension. It alters the fundamental starting point of analyzing state behavior, from 
questioning what leaders want, to asking what they wish to avoid. In democracies as 
well as dictatorships, the common theme remains political survival, making the Ph 
framework a highly useful tool in the study of policy decision-making. Therefore, just 
as Ph theory provides a cogent explanation and post-diction of the British decision in 
1922 to affirm the policy of the Jewish national home, it possesses the scope needed 
to address later and culturally and politically diverse case studies, making it a highly 
useful methodology to assess third party roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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